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Simultaneous Wireless Information Power Transfer
for MISO Secrecy Channel
Zheng Chu, Zhengyu Zhu, Student Member, IEEE, Martin Johnston, Member, IEEE and Ste´phane Le Goff
Abstract—This paper investigates simultaneous wireless infor-
mation and power transfer (SWIPT) for a multiple-input-single-
output (MISO) secrecy channel. First, transmit beamforming
without artificial noise (AN) is designed to achieve the secrecy
rate maximization problem subject to the transmit power and the
energy harvesting constraints. This problem is not convex, but
can be solved by applying a bisection search to a sequence of the
associated power minimization problems, each of which can be
solved by using a novel relaxation approach. Moreover, we extend
our proposed algorithms to the robust case by incorporating
channel uncertainties. Then, transmit beamforming with AN is
investigated for the secrecy rate maximization problem, where
two relaxation approaches are presented, a two-level optimization
algorithm and a successive convex approximation (SCA) to solve
the secrecy rate maximization problem. In addition, tightness
analyses of rank relaxation are provided to show that the optimal
transmit covariance matrix exactly returns rank-one. Simulation
results are provided to validate the performance of the proposed
algorithms.
Index Terms—MISO system, SWIPT, physical-layer secrecy,
bisection method, successive convex approximation (SCA).
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy harvesting is employed in fifth-generation (5G)
wireless communication networks to circumvent the issue of
energy limitations in mobile devices and improve the energy
efficiency of these networks by extracting energy from the
external natural environment (e.g., solar power, wind energy,
etc.) [1], [2].
Traditionally, energy is directly harvested from external
sources without exploiting the resources of the communication
network itself. However, when the natural environment is not
able to provide stable energy, wireless mobile receivers have
to find an alternative energy source in the communication
network. This source can be the information-carrying radio-
frequency (RF) signal radiated by the fixed transmitters (base
stations, hot spots, etc.) [3]–[5]. In this case, the role of
the transmitter is not only to send the signal to the mobile
receivers, but also transfer power that can be used to charge
these receivers’ batteries. Simultaneous wireless information
and power transfer (SWIPT) is a promising paradigm to
provide power for communication devices to mitigate the
energy scarcity and extend the lifetime of wireless networks
[3], [4].
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Over the past few years, the issue of secrecy performance
has become increasingly crucial in wireless communication
networks. In particular, there has been a growing interest
in physical-layer security. Unlike traditional cryptographic
methods that are employed to improve secrecy performance
in the network layer, physical-layer security relies upon the
principles of information theory to improve the security of
wireless communications [6]–[8].
Among all configurations that have been considered in
the study of physical-layer security algorithms, the multiple
antenna wiretap channel model has recently received a great
deal of attention due to the advent of multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) communication systems [9], [10]. Several
algorithms have thus been introduced to improve the physical-
layer security performance of multiple-antenna transceivers.
Some of these techniques, i.e., cooperative beamforming (CB),
cooperative jamming (CJ), artificial noise (AN) and device-to-
device transmission (D2D) achieve their goal by attempting to
increase the amount of interference received by eavesdroppers
[11]–[18].
Recently, secure communication in SWIPT has been inves-
tigated in [19]–[26]. In [19], the authors have considered a
MISO system. Two optimization problems: 1) secrecy rate
maximization of IR subject to individual harvested energy
constraints of ERs, 2) energy harvesting maximization subject
to a secrecy rate constraint for the IR, have been developed to
guarantee a reliable information transmission to the IR and the
target harvested energy simultaneously transferred to the ERs
are satisfied by optimally designing the beamforming vectors
and their power allocation at the transmitter. In [21], the
authors first addressed the secure communication system with
SWIPT when two types of eavesdroppers (i.e., passive eaves-
droppers and potential eavesdroppers) coexist. A total transmit
power minimization problem was formulated to jointly opti-
mize the transmit beamforming, AN and energy beamforming,
achieving secure communications with a target amount of
harvested power by incorporating channel uncertainties of the
idle receivers (potential eavesdroppers). While [22] considered
a multiuser MISO SWIPT system with multi-antenna energy
harvesting receivers (potential eavesdroppers) only, where an
energy harvesting maximization problem is proposed to guar-
antee secure communications. In addition, the authors have
shown that there always exists a rank-one optimal transmit
covariance solution and proposed one efficient algorithm to
construct an equivalent rank-one optimal solution [19], [22].
However, in [19], [22], the CSI is assumed to be available, or
only the CSI of the potential eavesdropper is unavailable at the
transmitter [20], [21], for which there are practical difficulties
to obtain the CSI of the link between the transmitter and
the users due to the channel estimation and the quantization
errors. Furthermore, robust secure transmission for a MISO
SWIPT system have been proposed without AN [24], with
AN [25], and with CJ [26], respectively, by incorporating the
channel uncertainties of all channels. In [24], [25], semidefinite
relaxation (SDR) has been studied to solve the secrecy rate
maximization problem, however, the suboptimal solution has
been proposed to guarantee the solution of the relaxed problem
is rank-one [24], whereas in [25], [26], the authors have shown
the optimal solution of the relaxed problem is rank-two, which
are not exact.
Motivated by the existing work, in this paper, we consider
the SWIPT scheme for a MISO secrecy system with multi-
ple eavesdroppers and multiple EH receivers, where secure
transmit beamforming without AN and with AN are designed.
The contribution of this paper is that we address the following
problems:
1) Secrecy rate optimization without AN: We formulate
the secrecy rate maximization problem to design the
transmit beamforming without AN, which is not convex
and cannot be solved directly. Unlike the conventional
SDR [24], we propose a novel reformulation for the
secrecy rate maximization problem based on the bi-
section search to solve a sequence of the associated
power minimization problems, each of which can be
solved by employing a novel relaxation. In addition,
these associated robust schemes are investigated by
incorporating channel uncertainties.
2) Secrecy rate optimization with AN: The secrecy rate
maximization problem is formulated to jointly optimize
transmit beamforming and AN. In this paper, we first
propose the two-level problem, the inner level problem
can be relaxed by semidefinite relaxation (SDR), the
outer level problem is a single-variable optimization
problem, which is solved by using a one-dimensional
line search algorithm. Then, successive convex approxi-
mation (SCA) based secrecy rate maximization problem
is proposed, where we approximate the non-convex
constraint and reformulate the secrecy rate maximization
problem as a convex one. Moreover, we extend our
proposed schemes to the robust case by incorporating
channel uncertainties. Tightness analyses for the relax-
ation of the secrecy rate maximization problems are
provided to show the relaxed problem yields rank-one
solution.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows.
A system model is described in Section II. The secrecy
rate optimization problems with SWIPT are solved to jointly
optimize the transmit beamforming without AN in Section
III. The secrecy rate optimization problem with SWIPT to
jointly optimize the transmit beaforming with AN is inves-
tigated in Section IV. The computation complexity of the
proposed algorithms is given in section V. Section VI provides
simulation results to support the proposed schemes. Finally,
the conclusions are presented in Section VII.
A. Notation
We use the upper case boldface letters for matrices and
lower case boldface letters for vectors. (·)T , (·)∗ and (·)H
denote the transpose, conjugate and conjugate transpose re-
spectively. Tr(·) and E{·} stand for trace of a matrix and
the statistical expectation for random variables. Vec(A) is
the vector obtained by stacking the columns of A on top
of one another and ⊗ is the Kronecker product. A  0
indicates that A is a positive semidefinite matrix. I and
(·)−1 denote the identity matrix with appropriate size and
the inverse of a matrix respectively. ‖ · ‖2 represents the
Euclidean norm of a matrix. <{·} stands for the real part of
a complex number, whereas |A| denotes the determinant of
A. [x]+ represents max{x, 0}. The distribution of a circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) vector with mean vector
x and covariance matrix Σ is denoted by CN (x,Σ), and ∼
means “distributed as”. The notation K denotes the following
generalized inequality:[
p
w
]
K 0⇔ ‖w‖2≤p.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a MISO secured SWIPT channel, comprising
one multiantenna legitimate transmitter, one legitimate user,
K eavesdroppers and L energy harvesting (EH) receivers. It
is assumed that the transmitter is equipped with NT transmit
antennas, whereas the legitimate user, the eavesdroppers and
the EH receivers each have a single receive antenna. The
channel coefficients between the legitimate transmitter and the
legitimate user, the k-th eavesdropper as well as the l-th EH
receiver are denoted by hs ∈ CNT×1, he,k ∈ CNT×1 and
hl ∈ CNT×1, respectively. The noise power at the legitimate
user and the eavesdroppers are assumed to be σ2s and σ
2
e . The
received signal at the legitimate user and the k-th eavesdropper
can be written as
ys = h
H
s ws+ns, ye,k=h
H
e,kws+ne,k, k = 1, ...,K,
where s and w ∈ CNT×1 are the desired signal for the
legitimate user (E{|s|2} = 1) and the transmit beamforming
at the legitimate transmitter, respectively. In addition, ns ∼
CN (0, σ2s) and ne,k ∼ CN (0, σ2e) represent the noise of the
legitimate user and the k-th eavesdropper, respectively. Thus,
the achieved secrecy rate at the legitimate user is expressed as
follows:
Rs=
[
log
(
1+
|hHs w|2
σ2s
)
−max
k
log
(
1+
|hHe,kw|2
σ2e
)]+
,∀k. (1)
The harvested energy at the l-th EH receiver is written as
El = ξl|hHl w|2, ∀l, (2)
where ξl ∈ (0, 1] is the energy conversion efficiency of the
energy transducers at the l-th energy receiver that accounts for
the loss in the energy transducers for converting the harvested
energy to electrical energy to be stored [23]. For convenience,
we assume that ξl = 1, ∀l, in this paper.
Remark 1: This system model consists of L EH receivers,
which harvest power carried by the RF signal without AN or
with AN based on a reliable transmission scenario. These EH
receivers sometimes play a “ helper ” role by employing the
harvested power to introduce a jamming signal to confuse the
eavesdroppers [27]. However, the efficiency of this harvest-
and-jamming policy is dependant on the network topology
[28]. In this paper, we mainly focus on the secrecy rate
optimization without AN or with AN. The EH performance of
the EH receivers is exploited, whereas how to use the harvested
power is outside the scope of our paper.
III. SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION WITHOUT AN
In this section, we consider a MISO secrecy channel with
multiple eavesdroppers and EH receivers described in Section
II, where secure beamforming is designed without AN to
achieve the secrecy rate maximization subject to the transmit
power and the EH constraints. This optimization is written as
follows:
max
w
min
k
Rs, s.t. ‖w‖2 ≤ P, min
l
El ≥ E, ∀k, l, (3)
where P is the maximum available transmit power at the legit-
imate transmitter, and E denotes the target harvested energy of
the EH receivers. These above problems are not convex, and
cannot be solved directly. Unlike existing literature [24], where
rank relaxation is considered to reformulate the secrecy rate,
however, it is challenging to show a rank-one solution. In this
paper, we propose a novel relaxation method for the secrecy
rate maximization problem to circumvent rank relaxation.
The secrecy rate maximization problem (3) is not convex
in terms of the nonconvex secrecy rate objective function
and EH constraint, and cannot be solved directly. Thus, this
problem can be solved by considering a sequence of power
minimization problems, one for each target rate R > 0. The
optimal solution of the secrecy rate maximization problem can
be obtained by solving the corresponding power minimization
problem with different R, which can be obtained by using
bisection search over R [29], [30]. Next, we will focus on the
following power minimization problem,
min
w
‖w‖2, s.t. min
k
Rs ≥ R, min
l
El ≥ E, ∀k, l. (4)
A. Power Minimization
Now, we consider the power minimization problem based
on the assumption that the transmitter has perfect CSI of the
legitimate user, the eavesdroppers and the EH receivers. Thus,
the problem in (4) can be relaxed as
min
w
‖w‖2, s.t. log
(
1+
|hHs w|2
σ2s
)
−log
(
1+
|hHe,kw|2
σ2e
)
≥R,
|hHl w|2≥E, ∀k, l. (5)
The above problem is not convex in terms of the non-convex
secrecy rate and EH constraints. In order to circumvent these
issues, the following lemma is required to tackle the power
minimization problem (5):
Lemma 1: The problem in (5) is reformulated into the
following form:
min
w,s1
s1, s.t.
[
s1
w
]
K 0,
Sk=

1
σs
wHhsI
[
2
R
2
σe
wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12
]
[
2
R
2
σe
wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12
]H
1
σs
wHhs
  0, ∀k,
xl = <{wHhl}, yl = ={wHhl}, ul = [xl yl],
‖u(n)l ‖2 + 2
2∑
i=1
u
(n)
l (i)[ul(i)− u(n)l (i)] ≥ E, ∀l. (6)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
In problem (6), the secrecy rate constraint is reformulated into
linear matrix inequality (LMI), whereas the EH constraint is
approximated by a first-order Taylor series expansion, thus this
problem is a convex problem for a given ul. An initialization
value of the vector ul is randomly generated and can be
updated at each iteration. The algorithm converges when
u
(n+1)
l = u
(n)
l holds, and it is guaranteed to converge to a
locally optimal solution (quite close to the globally optimal
solution) [31], [32].
B. Robust Power Minimization
In the previous section, we have solved the power mini-
mization problem based on the assumption that the legitimate
transmitter has perfect CSI. However, it is not always possible
to have perfect CSI due to the lack of cooperation as well as
channel estimation and quantization errors. Thus, we consider
the robust scheme by incorporating norm-bounded channel
uncertainties in the following.
1) Channel Uncertainty: In this subsection, it is assumed
that the CSI is not available at the legitimate transmitter. The
channel uncertainties are modelled as
hs= h¯s+es, he,k= h¯e,k+ee,k, ∀k, hl= h¯l+el, ∀l,
where h¯s, h¯e,k and h¯l denote the estimated channels of the
legitimate user, the k-th eavesdropper and the l-th EH receiver,
and es, ee,k and el represent the corresponding channel errors,
which are assumed to be bounded as
‖es‖2 = ‖hs−h¯s‖2≤εs, for εs ≥ 0, ,
‖ee,k‖2 = ‖he,k−h¯e,k‖2≤εe,k, for εe,k ≥ 0, ∀k,
‖el‖2 = ‖hl−h¯l‖2≤εl, for εl ≥ 0, ∀l,
where εs, εe,k and εl represent the norm bounds of the channel
errors.
2) Robust Power Minimization with Channel Uncertainty:
Now, we solve the robust power minimization problem by
incorporating the channel uncertainties. Thus, this robust prob-
lem is formulated as follows:
min
w
‖w‖2, s.t. min
es
log
(
1+
|(h¯s + es)Hw|2
σ2s
)
−
max
ee,k
log
(
1+
|(h¯e,k + ee,k)Hw|2
σ2e
)
≥R, ∀k, (7a)
min
el
|(h¯l + el)Hw|2≥E, ∀l. (7b)
The problem (7) is not convex in terms of channel uncertain-
ties, and cannot be solved directly. Thus, we first consider the
reformulation of the secrecy rate constraint in (7a), which can
be relaxed as
1
σs
(
wH h¯s−εs‖w‖
)
≥ √t2,[
2
R
2
σe
(h¯e,k+ee,k)
Hw (2R−1) 12
][ 2R2
σe
wH(h¯e,k+ee,k)
(2R−1) 12
]
≤t2,
(8)
The first constraint in (8) is rewritten based on a first-order
Taylor approximation as follows:
1
σs
<{wH h¯s}− εs
σs
‖w‖ ≥ f (n)(t2), (9)
where f (n)(t2) =
√
t
(n)
2 +
1
2
√
t
(n)
2
(t2 − t(n)2 ).
Lemma 2: The second constraint in (8) can be reformulated
as
S¯k=

Sk,1−λk
[
0 −1 ] [ 0−1
]
−εe,k
 2
R
2
σe
wH
0
0

−εe,k
[
2
R
2
σe
wH 0 0
]
λkI
0,∀k.
(10)
where
Sk,1 =

f (n)(t2)I
[
2
R
2
σe
wH h¯e,k
(2R − 1) 12
]
[
2
R
2
σe
wH h¯e,k
(2R − 1) 12
]H
f (n)(t2)
 . (11)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
Thus, the robust power minimization problem can be written
as
min
s2,w,λk
s2, s.t.
[
s2
w
]
K 0, S¯k(λk, f (n)(t2))  0, ∀k,
1
σs
wH h¯s− εs
σs
‖w‖ ≥ f (n)(t2),
<{h¯Hl w} ≥ E
1
2 + εl‖w‖2, ={h¯Hl w} = 0, ∀l. (12)
The above problem is convex for a given t(n)2 at each iteration.
Thus, an initialization of t2 is given to solve the problem in
(12) by using interior-point method, which is updated itera-
tively. It is easily observed that t2 is updated to t
(n+1)
2 = t
n
2
when the algorithm converges.
IV. SECURE SWIPT OF JOINT BEAMFORMING AND
ARTIFICIAL NOISE DESIGN
In the previous section, we have solved the secrecy rate
optimization problems to optimize the transmit beamforming
without AN. In this section, we extend our attention to joint
transmit beamforming and AN design in the secrecy rate
maximization problem, where the legitimate transmitter sends
the signal with AN in order to introduce more interference to
the eavesdroppers.
A. Problem Formulation
We formulate the secrecy rate maximization problem with
the transmit power and the minimum EH constraints, where the
secured transmit beamforming (i.e., w) and AN beamforming
(i.e., v ∼ CN (0,V)) are jointly designed. This optimization
problem can be formulated as
max
w,V
min
k
log
(
1+
hHs ww
Hhs
hHs Vhs+σ
2
s
)
−log
(
1+
hHe,kww
Hhe,k
hHe,kVhe,k+σ
2
e
)
,
s.t. ‖w‖2+Tr(V)≤P, [wwH ](i,i)+[V](i,i)≤pi, ∀i,
min
l
|hHl w|2 + hHl Vhl ≥ El, ∀l, V  0, (13)
where [wwH ](i,i) + [V](i,i) (i = 1, ..., NT ) represents each
antenna transmit power constraint.
Remark 2: The proposed relaxation method is also suitable
for the scenario where the eavesdroppers and the EH receivers
are equipped with multiple antennas [33, Section V-D].
This optimization problem (13) is not convex and cannot be
solved directly. Thus, we propose two reformulations to make
this problem tractable, one dimensional line search based two-
level optimization algorithm and SCA. Unlike [25], where
it was shown that the relaxed problem returns rank-two. In
this paper, we provide a novel SDR for the secrecy rate
maximization problem, and show the optimal solution always
returns rank-one. We first employ the SDR to relax the original
problem (13) by using Qs = E{wwH} as follows:
max
Qs,V
log
(
1+
hHs Qshs
hHs Vhs+σ
2
s
)
−max
k
log
(
1+
hHe,kQshe,k
hHe,kVhe,k+σ
2
e
)
,
s.t. Tr(Qs+V) ≤ P, Tr[Ai(Qs+V)] ≤ pi, ∀i, (14a)
hHl (Qs + V)hl ≥ El, ∀l, (14b)
Qs  0,V  0, rank(Qs) = 1, (14c)
where Ai = aiaHi is the given antenna design parameters to
adjust each antenna power budget, and ai is a unit i-th vector
(i.e., [ai]j = 1 for i = j and [ai]j = 0 for i 6= j). The specific
applications of each antenna power constraint have already
been described in [17], [23].
B. Secrecy Rate Maximization
For the secrecy rate maximization problem (13), we will
provide two different algorithms to jointly optimize the trans-
mit beamforming and AN covariance matrix: one-dimensional
line search based two-level optimization algorithm and SCA.
1) One-Dimensional Line Search Based Two-Level Opti-
mization Algorithm: We first introduce a slack variable t, and
the problem (13) is rewritten as
max
Qs,V,t
Rs + log(t),
s.t. log
(
1 +
hHe,kQshe,k
hHe,kVhe,k + σ
2
e
)
≤ log(1
t
), ∀k,(15a)
(14a), (14b), (14c). (15b)
The problem in (15) is still not convex in terms of the
constraint (15a), and cannot be solved directly, thus, it can
be formulated as a two-stage optimization problem. The outer
problem is a function of t, which can be written as
max
t
log(1 + f(t)) + log(t), s.t. tmin ≤ t ≤ 1, (16)
It is easily derived that the lower bound tmin =(1+
P‖hs‖2
σ2s
)−1.
Then, the inner problem can be recast for a given t as follows:
f(t)= max
Qs,V
hHs Qshs
hHs Vhs+σ
2
s
, s.t.(15a), (14a), (14b), (14c). (17)
It is easily verified that the constraint in (15) can be reformu-
lated as
hHe,k
[
Qs−(1
t
−1)V
]
he,k≤(1
t
−1)σ2e . (18)
Then, (17) can be recast for a given t as
f(t)= max
Qs,V
hHs Qshs
hHs Vhs + σ
2
s
, s.t. (18), (14a), (14b), (14c). (19)
The problem (19) is a quasi-convex problem without the
nonconvex rank-one constraint, thus we consider the Charnes-
Cooper transformation to convert it into a convex problem. Let
us introduce δ so that Qs = Q¯sδ and V =
V¯
δ hold. Thus, we
have
f(t)= max
Q¯s,V¯,δ
hHs Q¯shs, s.t. h
H
s V¯hs + δσ
2
b = 1,
hHe,k
[
Q¯s−(1
t
−1)V¯
]
he,k≤(1
t
−1)δσ2e , ∀k,
Tr(Q¯s + V¯) ≤ δP, Tr[Ai(Q¯s + V¯)] ≤ δpi, ∀i,
hHl (Q¯s + V¯)hl ≥ δEl, ∀l, Q¯s  0, V¯  0. (20)
The problem (20) is a convex problem, and can be solved
efficiently by using interior-point method [34]. Thus, the
optimal solution to (19) can be obtained when rank(Qs) = 1
holds that will be shown in Section IV-B2, once (20) has been
solved.
2) Tightness Analyses of Rank Relaxation: Now we inves-
tigate the tightness of the rank relaxation to (19). We assume
that the optimal value f(t) can be obtained by the optimal
solution to (19), resulting in the following inequality,
hHs Qshs
hHs Vhs+σ
2
s
≥f(t)⇒hHs [Qs−f(t)V]hs≥f(t)σ2s , (21)
Thus, we consider the following power minimization,
min
Qs
Tr(Qs), s.t. (21), (18), (14a), (14b), (14c). (22)
It is easily verified that the feasible solution of (22) is the
optimal solution of (19) due to the constraints (21), (14a),
(14b), and (14c). Thus, the following theorem is provided to
show that every optimal solution to (22) is rank-one:
Theorem 1: If (19) is feasible, there always exists an optimal
solution (i.e., Qs) that satisfies rank(Qs) ≤ 1, which can be
obtained by solving (22).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
From Theorem 1, a tightness analysis has been provided so
that (19) has a rank-one solution for all feasible t.
3) Successive Convex Approximation: In this section, we
propose a SCA algorithm to jointly optimize the transmit
beamforming and AN, thus, (13) can be rewritten as
min
Qs,V
max
k
(
σ2e+Tr[he,kh
H
e,k(Qs+V)]
)(
σ2s+Tr(hsh
H
s V)
)
(
σ2s+Tr[hshHs (Qs+V)]
)(
σ2e+Tr(he,khHe,kV)
)
s.t. Tr(Qs + V) ≤ P, Tr[Ai(Qs + V)] ≤ pi, ∀i, (23a)
hHl (Qs + V)hl ≥ El, ∀l, (23b)
Qs  0, V  0, rank(Qs) = 1. (23c)
The above problem is not convex in terms of the objective
function. Let us introduce the following exponential variables
to equivalently convert the objective function,
ex0 =σ2s+Tr[hsh
H
s (Qs+V)], e
xk =σ2e+Tr(he,kh
H
e,kV),
eyk =σ2e+Tr[he,kh
H
e,k(Qs+V)], e
y0 =σ2s+Tr(hsh
H
s V).(24)
Thus, (23) is rewritten by introducing a slack variable τ as
min
Qs,V,x0,y0,xk,yk
τ (25a)
s.t. ey0−x0+yk−xk≤τ, (25b)
σ2s+Tr[hsh
H
s (Qs+V)]≥ex0 , σ2e+Tr(he,khHe,kV)≥exk , (25c)
σ2e+Tr[he,kh
H
e,k(Qs+V)]≤eyk , σ2s+Tr(hshHs V)≤ey0 , (25d)
(23a), (23b), (23c), ∀k, l, i. (25e)
The above problem is not still convex in terms of the constraint
(25d). Thus, a Taylor series expansion (i.e., axˆ + axˆ ln a(x−
xˆ) ≤ ax) is employed to linearise (25d) as follows:
σ2e+Tr[he,kh
H
e,k(Qs+V)] ≤ eyˆk(yk−yˆk+1), (26a)
σ2s+Tr(hsh
H
s V)≤eyˆ0(y0−yˆ0+1), (26b)
where yˆ0 and yˆk are approximated values such that y0 = yˆ0
and yk = yˆk when the approximations are tight. Thus, the
secrecy rate maximization problem can be relaxed as
min
Qs,V,x0,y0,xk,yk,τ
τ
s.t. (23a), (23b), (23c), (25b), (25c), (26), ∀k, l, i. (27)
The problem (27) is convex without the nonconvex rank-one
constraint for a given (yˆ0, yˆk), and can be solved by using
an interior-point method. From SCA, the approximation with
the current optimal solution can be updated iteratively until
the constraints (25c) and (25d) hold with equality, which
implies (23) is optimally solved. The optimal solution obtained
by the SCA algorithm at the n-th iteration is assumed to
be (Q∗s(n),V
∗(n), x∗0(n), y
∗
0(n), x
∗
k(n), y
∗
k(n), τ
∗(n)), which
can achieve a stable point when the SCA algorithm converges
[35]. In addition, provided that (23) is feasible for positive
secrecy rates, there exists an optimal solution of rank-one,
and the proof is similar to that of Theorem 1.
C. Robust Secrecy Rate Maximization
In this subsection, we turn our attention to the robust
secrecy rate maximization, which jointly optimize the transmit
beamforming and AN by incorporating channel uncertainties
shown in Section III-B1. In addition, the transmit power
constraint per antenna is considered, where the Hermitian
positive semidefinite (PSD) matrix Ai is not available at the
legitimate transmitter, thus the true PSD matrix can be written
as Ai = A¯i + ∆i, ∀i, where A¯i ∈ HNT+ is the estimated
Hermitian PSD matrix, and ∆i is estimated error of the matrix
A¯i, which can be modelled as a spherical uncertainty with a
norm-bound i (‖∆i‖F ≤ i) [20]. In the following, we relax
the robust secrecy rate maximization problem by incorporating
the channel uncertainties.
1) One Dimensional Line Search Based Two-Level Opti-
mization Algorithm: In this subsection, a robust scheme is
considered to jointly optimize transmit beamforming and AN
by incorporating channel uncertainties. Thus, the two-level
optimization framework discussed in the previous subsection
is employed by incorporating channel uncertainties. Since
the outer problem does not involve the channel uncertainties
similar to Section IV-B1, thus we focus on the inner problem
for a given t, which can be reformulated as
f(t)= max
Qs,V
(h¯s+es)
HQs(h¯s+es)
(h¯s+es)HV(h¯s+es)+σ2s
,
s.t. (h¯e,k+ee,k)
H
[
Qs−
(
1
t
−1
)
V
]
(h¯e,k+ee,k)≤(1
t
−1)σ2e ,
Tr(Qs + V)≤P, max
∆i
Tr[(A¯i+∆i)(Qs+V)]≤pi,
(h¯l+el)
H(Qs+V)(h¯l+el)≥El, ∀l,
Qs0,V0, rank(Qs) = 1. (28)
The above problem is not convex due to channel uncertainties.
Thus, we employ S-Procedure to solve this robust secrecy rate
maximization problem, which can be written as
f(t)= max
Qs,V,λe,k,αl
(h¯s + es)
HQs(h¯s + es)
(h¯s + es)HV(h¯s + es) + σ2s
,
s.t. Tr(Qs+V)≤P,Tr[A¯i(Qs+V)]+i‖Qs+V‖F ≤pi,(29a)[
λe,kI−[Qs−( 1t−1)V] −[Qs−( 1t−1)V]h¯e,k−h¯He,k[Qs−( 1t−1)V] ck
]
0, (29b)[
αlI+(Qs+V) (Qs+V)h¯l
h¯Hl (Qs+V) h¯
H
l (Qs+V)h¯l−El−αlε2l
]
0, (29c)
Qs0,V0, rank(Qs) = 1, ∀i, k, l, (29d)
where ck = −h¯He,k[(Qs−1t−1)V]h¯e,k+( 1t−1)σ2e−λe,kε2e,k. Let
us introduce a slack variable τ to relax the objective function
to (29), and by exploiting S-Procedure and Charnes-Cooper
transformation, we have
f(t)= max
Q¯s,V¯,λs,µs,λe,k,αl,δ,τ
τ,
s.t.
[
λsI+Q¯s Q¯sh¯s
h¯Hs Q¯s h¯
H
s Q¯sh¯s−τ−λsε2s
]
0,[
µsI−V¯ −V¯h¯s
−h¯Hs V¯ −h¯Hs V¯h¯s−δσ2s+1−µsε2s
]
0,[
λe,kI−[Q¯s−( 1t−1)V¯] −[Q¯s−( 1t−1)V¯]h¯e,k−h¯He,k[Q¯s−( 1t−1)V¯] c¯k
]
 0,[
αlI+(Q¯s+V¯) (Q¯s+V¯)h¯l
h¯Hl (Q¯s+V¯) h¯
H
l (Q¯s+V¯)h¯l−δEl−αlε2l
]
0,
Tr[A¯i(Q¯s+V¯)]+i‖Q¯s+V¯‖F ≤δpi,∀i,
Tr(Q¯s + V¯) ≤ δP, Q¯s0, V˜0, t≥0. (30)
where c¯k = −h¯He,k[Q¯s−( 1t−1)V¯]h¯e,k+δ( 1t−1)σ2e−λe,kε2e,k.
Without the nonconvex rank constraint, (30) is convex, and
can be solved by using interior-point method. By solving the
problem (30), we can obtain the optimal value f(t)∗, which
can be written based on channel uncertainties as
(h¯s + es)
HQs(h¯s + es)
(h¯s + es)HV(h¯s + es) + σ2s
≥ f(t)∗,
⇒ (h¯s + es)H [Qs − f(t)∗V](h¯s + es) ≥ f(t)∗σ2s , (31)
Thus, the associated power minimization problem is consid-
ered as
min
Qs,V,αl,βs,λe,k
Tr(Qs),
s.t. (29a)− (29c), (32a)[
βsI+[Qs−f(t)∗V] [Qs−f(t)∗V]h¯s
h¯Hs [Qs−f(t)∗V] ds
]
 0, (32b)
where ds = h¯Hs [Qs−f(t)∗V]h¯s−f(t)∗σ2s−βsε2s. It is easily
verified that the feasible solution to (32) is optimal for (29),
which is derived from (32a) and (32b). Thus, the following
theorem holds to show that the optimal solution to (29) is
rank-one:
Theorem 2: Provided that (29) is feasible, its optimal
solution always returns rank-one, which can be obtained by
solving (32).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D.
2) Successive Convex Approximation: Now, we consider
the second reformulation based on SCA for the secrecy rate
maximization problem to jointly optimize transmit beamform-
ing and AN covariance matrix. The optimization framework
can also be reformulated as a convex form by incorporating
channel uncertainties. Thus, this robust secrecy rate maximiza-
tion problem can be rewritten as
min
Qs,V
max
k
te,krs
tsre,k
(33a)
s.t. Tr(Qs+V)≤P, Tr[(A¯i+∆i)(Qs+V)]≤pi,∀i, (33b)
hHl (Qs + V)hl ≥ El, ∀l, (33c)
Qs  0, V  0, rank(Qs) = 1. (33d)
where te,k = σ2e+(h¯e,k+ee,k)
H(Qs+V)(h¯e,k+ee,k), rs =
σ2s+(h¯s+es)
HV(h¯s+es), ts = σ2s+(h¯s+es)
H(Qs+V)(h¯s+es)
and re,k = σ2e+(h¯e,k+ee,k)
HV(h¯e,k+ee,k). Let us introduce
the following relations for (33a)
ex0 ≤ σ2s + min
es
(h¯s + es)
H(Qs + V)(h¯s + es), (34a)
exk ≤ σ2e + min
ee,k
(h¯e,k + ee,k)
HV(h¯e,k + ee,k), (34b)
eyk ≥ σ2e+max
ee,k
(h¯e,k+ee,k)
H(Qs+V)(h¯e,k+ee,k),(34c)
ey0 ≥ σ2s + max
es
(h¯s + es)
HV(h¯s + es), (34d)
By employing the slack variables (i.e., τ , us, ue,k, vs, and ve,k)
for (33a), (34a)-(34d), respectively, (33) can be equivalently
modified as
min
Ω
τ, s.t. ey0+yk−x0−xk≤τ, (33b), (33c), (33d),
ex0≤σ2s+us,min
es
(h¯s+es)
H [Qs+V](h¯s+es)≥us, (35a)
exk≤σ2e+ue,k,min
ee,k
(h¯e,k+ee,k)
HV(h¯e,k+ee,k)≥ue,k, (35b)
eyk≥σ2e+ve,k,max
ee,k
(h¯e,k+ee,k)
H(Qs+V)(h¯e,k+ee,k)≤ve,k,
(35c)
ey0≥σ2s+vs,max
es
(h¯s+es)
HV(h¯s+es)≤vs, (35d)
{Qs,V,es,ee,k,x0,y0,xk,yk,us,ue,k,vs,ve,k}∈Ω,∀k, l, i. (35e)
By exploiting S-Procedure and a first-order Taylor series
approximation, we have
min
Ω
τ,
s.t. ey0+yk−x0−xk≤τ, ex0≤σ2s+us, exk≤σ2e+ue,k, (36a)
ey¯k(yk−y¯k+1)≥σ2e+ve,k, ey¯0(y0−y¯0+1)≥σ2s+vs, (36b)[
λsI+(Qs+V) (Qs+V)h¯s
h¯Hs (Qs+V) h¯
H
s (Qs+V)h¯s−us−λsε2s
]
0, (36c)[
λe,kI+V Vh¯e,k
h¯He,kV h¯
H
e,kVh¯e,k−ue,k−λe,kε2e,k
]
 0, (36d)[
βe,kI−(Qs + V) −(Qs+V)h¯e,k
−h¯He,k(Qs+V) −h¯He,k(Qs+V)h¯e,k+ve,k−βe,kε2e,k
]
0,
(36e)[
βsI−V −Vh¯s
−h¯Hs V −h¯Hs Vh¯s+vs−βsε2s
]
0, (36f)[
αlI+(Qs+V) (Qs+V)h¯l
h¯Hl (Qs+V) h¯
H
l (Qs+V)h¯l−El−αlε2l
]
0, (36g)
Tr(Qs+V)≤P, Tr[A¯i(Qs+V)]+i‖Qs+V‖F ≤pi,
{Qs0,V0, x0, y0, xk, yk, us, ue,k, vs, ve,k,
λs ≥ 0, λe,k ≥ 0, βs ≥ 0, βe,k ≥ 0, αl ≥ 0}∈Ω, ∀k, l, i. (36h)
The above problem is convex for a given y¯k and y¯0 at each
iteration, and can be solved by using the interior-point method
to update the solution for the next iteration until the algorithm
converges. On the other hand, there exists a rank-onel solution
to (36), and the proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.
V. COMPUTATION COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide the computation complexity
analysis for our proposed algorithms in Section III and Section
IV, which is analysed by applying the basic elements of
complexity analysis as used in [36].
First, we consider the secrecy rate maximization problem
without AN in perfect and imperfect CSI, where a bisection
search is employed to solve (6) and (12), where Mmax1 and T1
are defined as the iteration number of the Taylor approximation
and bisection search, respectively. The problem (6) has one
second-order cone (SOC) constraint of dimension NT + 1, K
LMI constraints of size 3, and L linear constraints. Here, the
number of decision variables n is on the order of NT +2L+1.
While (12) involves L + 2 SOCs, including 2 SOCs with
dimension NT + 1, L SOCs with dimension NT , K LMI
constraints of size NT + 3, and L linear constraints. The
number of variables n is on the order of NT +K + 2.
Then, we provide the computation complexity for the se-
crecy rate maximization problems (20) and (27), which are
solved by employing a one-dimensional line search and SCA.
Thus, T2 and Mmax2 are defined as the iteration number of
the one-dimensional line search and SCA, respectively. For
problem (20), which involves 2 LMI constraints with size
NT , and NT + L + K + 2 linear constraints. The number
of variables n is on the order of 2NT + 1. Problem (27)
involves 2 LMI constraint with size NT , and NT +L+3K+4
linear constraints. The number of variables n is on the order
of 2NT + 2K + 3.
Finally, we consider the computation complexity for the
robust secrecy rate problems (30) and (36) by incorporating
channel uncertainties. The problem (30) has NT SOCs with
dimension 2NT + 1, K + L + 2 LMI constraints with size
NT + 1, 2 LMI constrains with size NT , and L + K + 3
linear constraints. The number of variables n is on the order
of 2NT +K + L+ 3. While problem (36) involves NT with
dimension 2NT + 1, 2K + L + 2 LMI constraints with size
NT + 1, and 5K + L + 5 linear constraints. The number of
variables n is on the order of 2NT + 6K + L+ 6. Based on
the aforementioned analysis, the computation complexities for
all of our proposed algorithms are shown in Table (I).
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results to validate our
proposed algorithms. We consider a MISO secrecy system in
the presence of three eavesdroppers and two EH receivers. The
legitimate transmitter is equipped with four transmit antennas
(i.e., NT = 4), whereas the other receivers (i.e., legitimate
user, eavesdroppers and EH receivers) are equipped with a
single antenna. We assume channel models with both large-
scale fading and small-scale fading. The simplified large-scale
fading model is given by D = A0
(
d
dr
)−α
, for d ≥ dr, where
A0 = 1, d represents the distance between the transmitter and
all receivers (i.e., legitimate user ds, passive eavesdroppers de,
and the energy receivers dl), dr denotes a reference distance
set to be 20 meters, and α = 3 is the path loss exponent.
The small scale fading channel coefficients are assumed to
be Rician fading with Rician factor 5 dB. Note that for the
involved line-of-sight (LOS) component is modelled as the far-
field uniform linear antenna array [37]. In addition, we assume
that σ2s = σ
2
e = −40 dBm, and the distances between the
transmitter and the legitimate user, the passive eavesdroppers,
as well as the energy receivers are set to be 100, 50, 25 meters
unless specified. The target transmit power is assumed to be
30 dBm or 1w, and the target harvested power is set to be
1mw. All error bounds (i.e., εs, εe,k and εl) are replaced by ε
for convenience, which is set to be 0.1 or 0.2 unless specified.
We first provide the simulation results for the case without
AN. Fig. 1 shows the achieved secrecy rate with differ-
ent transmit powers, where it is easily observed that the
achieved secrecy rate increases with transmit power, and our
proposed scheme achieves the same performance with SDR
based scheme in terms of achieved secrecy rate. In order
to improve the security in SWIPT, AN assisted secrecy rate
TABLE I: Computation Complexity Analysis of Proposed Algorithms
Algorithms Complexity Order (suppressing ln( 1

), where  denotes the accuracy requirement.)
Problem (6) O
(
nT1Mmax1
√
2NT + 2 + 3K + L[K(3
3 + n32) + L+ (NT + 1)
2 + n2]
)
, where n = O(NT + 2L+ 1).
Problem (12) O
(
nT1Mmax1
√
KNT + 4 + 3K + 3L[K((NT + 3)
3 + n(NT + 3)
2) + 2(NT + 1)
2 + L(NT )
2 + L+ n2]
)
,
where n = O(NT +K + 2).
Problem (20) O
(
nT2
√
3NT +K + L+ 2[2(N
3
T + nN
2
T ) +NT + L+K + 2 + n
2]
)
, where n = O(2NT + 1).
Problem (27) O
(
nMmax2
√
3NT + L+ 3K + 4[2(N
3
T + nN
2
T ) +NT + L+ 3K + 4 + n
2]
)
, where n = O(2NT + 2K + 3).
Problem (30) O
(
nT2
√
Θ[(K + L+ 2)((NT + 1)
3 + n(NT + 1)
2) + 2(N3T + nN
2
T ) +NT (2NT + 1)
2 + L+K + 3 + n2]
)
,
where Θ = KNT + LNT + 6NT + 2K + 2L+ 5, and n = O(2NT +K + L+ 3).
Problem (36) O
(
nMmax2
√
Θ[(2KL+ L+ 2)((NT + 1)
3 + n(NT + 1)
2) + 5K + L+ 5 +NT (2NT + 1)
2 + n2]
)
,
where Θ = 2KLNT + 7KL+ 4NT + 7, and n = O(2NT + 6K + L+ 6).
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Fig. 1: Achieved secrecy rate with different transmit powers.
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Fig. 2: AN assisted achieved secrecy rate with different transmit
powers.
versus transmit power is plotted in Fig. 2 based on two of our
proposed schemes: one-dimensional search based two-level
optimization algorithm and SCA. From this result, we can
observe that the two proposed schemes increase with transmit
power, and both schemes have a similar performance in terms
of secrecy rate. In addition, in lower transmit power regime,
the SCA based scheme outperforms one-dimensional search
based two-level optimization scheme (‘1D’).
Then, we evaluate the security performance with energy
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Fig. 3: AN assisted achieved secrecy rate with target harvested
power.
harvesting. Fig. 3 shows the achieved secrecy rate versus the
target harvested power, where it can be observed that the
secrecy rate decreases with the target harvested power based
on perfect and imperfect CSI. Also, we compare our proposed
schemes (‘1D’ and ‘SCA’) with the scheme shown in [25] (‘1D
Benchmark’), one-dimensinal line search based scheme with
Gaussian randomization (‘1D GR’), two-dimensional search
based scheme (‘2D’), and the case without AN (‘NO AN’),
in which our proposed SCA based scheme outperforms our
proposed 1D scheme, 1D Benchmark scheme, 1D GR scheme,
and NO AN scheme. The SCA based scheme has a similar
performance to 2D based scheme in terms of secrecy rate.
Fig. 4 shows the percentage of AN power consumption in the
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Fig. 4: The proportion of AN power consumption with different
transmit powers.
total transmit power P with different transmit powers, which
shows the proportion of AN power consumed to confuse the
eavesdroppers or for energy harvesting. One can observe that
this proportion increases and then declines after approximately
26 dBm due to the low SNRs at the legitimate user and passive
eavesdroppers at the low transmit power regime. Therefore, it
is not necessary to consume a large amount of AN power. With
the increase in transmit power, the percentage of consumed AN
power should increase which ensures secure communications
and satisfies the EH constraint. When transmit power is high
enough, in order to further increase the secrecy rate required,
more power should be allocated to the message-bearing signals
so that the AN power may get decreased. The scheme without
EH receivers has a lower proportion than the scheme with
EN receivers, since the AN is introduced to interfere with the
passive eavesdropper only in the system without EH receiver.
Finally, we evaluate the secrecy rate and the EH per-
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formance versus the distances between the transmitter and
the legitimate user (i.e., ds), as well as the EH receivers
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Distance between transmitter and EH receivers dp (m)
H
ar
ve
st
ed
 p
ow
er
 (m
w)
 
 
1D based scheme
SCA based scheme
Fig. 6: Harvested power with different distances between the
transmitter and the energy receivers.
(i.e., dl), respectively, when P = 20 dBm. Fig. 5 shows the
secrecy rate versus ds, where one can observe that the secrecy
rate decreases with ds. In addition, the SCA based scheme
outperforms the 1D based scheme in terms of secrecy rate.
Fig. 6 shows the EH performance versus dl. From this result,
the harvested power decreases with dl, approaching zero after
ds = 40 m.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the secrecy rate maxi-
mization problem for a MISO secrecy channel with SWIPT in
the presence of multiple eavesdroppers and EH receivers. We
first proposed a novel reformulation to optimize the transmit
beamforming without AN based on perfect CSI and imprefect
CSI. Then, joint optimization for transmit beamforming with
AN have been considered for the secrecy rate maximization
problem based on both perfect and imperfect CSI. We reformu-
lated this optimization problem by using one-dimensional line
search based two-level optimization and SCA based schemes,
respectively. Furthermore, we provided a tightness analysis for
this optimization problem, which shows the optimal solution of
this secrecy rate maximization problem exactly returns rank-
one. Simulation results have been provided to validate the
performance of our proposed schemes.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
In order to prove Lemma 1, we first rewrite the secrecy rate
constraint in (5) as
1
σ2s
|wHhs|2≥
[
2
R
2
σe
wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12
]H[
2
R
2
σe
wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12
]
(37)
By exploiting the Schur complement [34], (37) can be refor-
mulated as
1
σs
wHhsI
[
2
R
2
σe
wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12
]
[
2
R
2
σe
wHhe,k
(2R − 1) 12
]H
1
σs
wHhs
  0, (38)
In addition, we consider the reformulation of the EH constraint
in (5). In order to express this constraint clearly, we introduce
two variables (i.e., xl ∈ R and yl ∈ R) such that this constraint
can be equivalently modified as
x2l + y
2
l ≥ E, (39a)
xl = <{wHhl}, yl = ={wHhl}, ∀l. (39b)
The constraint (39b) is convex (linear), whereas (39a) is not
convex, thus, a first-order Taylor approximation is considered
to obtain the desired upper bound.
Setting ul = [xl yl]T , gives, x2l +y
2
l = u
T
l ul. u
(n)
l is the n-th
iteration of the vector ul. Thus, (39a) can be approximated as
uTl ul ≈ ‖u(n)l ‖2 + 2
2∑
i=1
u
(n)
l (i)[ul(i)− u(n)l (i)], (40)
where i denotes the i-th element of the vector ul.
This completes Lemma 1. 
B. Proof of Lemma 2
The second constraint in (8) can be rewritten by exploiting
the Schur complement as
S
′
k=

f (n)(t2)I
[
2
R
2
σe
wH(h¯e,k+ee,k)
(2R−1) 12
]
[
2
R
2
σe
wH(h¯e,k+ee,k)
(2R−1) 12
]H
f (n)(t2)
0,
(41)
where f (n)(t2) has been defined in (9). In order to remove
the impact of the channel uncertainties, we employ [38,
Proposition 2], and the constraint in (41) is written as
Sk
 2
R
2
σe
wH
0
0
 ee,k [0 −1 ]+[ 0−1
]
eHe,k
[
2
R
2
σe
w 0 0
]
, (42)
where
Sk =

f (n)(t2)I
[
2
R
2
σe
wH h¯e,k
(2R−1) 12
]
[
2
R
2
σe
wH h¯e,k
(2R−1) 12
]H
f (n)(t2)
 (43)
Thus, the robust secrecy rate constraint can be reformulated
as
S¯k=

Sk−λk
[
0 −1 ] [ 0−1
]
−εe,k
 2
R
2
σe
wH
0
0

−εe,k
[
2
R
2
σe
wH 0 0
]
λkI
0,∀k. (44)
This completes Lemma 2. 
C. Proof of Theorem 1
In order to show Theorem 1, we check the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions of (22). First, its Lagrange dual
function can be written as
L(Qs,V,Y,Z, λ, µ, ηi, νl, τk)=Tr(Qs)
−λ
[
Tr[hshHs (Qs−f(t)V)]−σ2sf(t)
]
+µ
[
Tr(Qs+V)−P
]
+
NT∑
i=1
ηi
[
Tr[Ai(Qs+V)]−pi
]
−
L∑
l=1
νl
[
Tr[hlhHl (Qs+V)]
−El
]
+
K∑
k=1
τk
[
Tr[he,khHe,k(Qs−(t−1)V)]−(t− 1)σ2e
]
−Tr(YQs)−Tr(ZV), (45)
where Y ∈ HNT+ , Z ∈ HNT+ , λ ∈ R+, µ ∈ R+, ηi ∈ R+, νl ∈R+, τk ∈ R+ denote the dual variables of Qs, V, (21), (14a),
(14b), and (18), respectively. Then, we consider the following
related KKT conditions:
∂L
∂Qs
= 0,⇒ Y=I−λhshHs +µI+
NT∑
i=1
ηiAi−
L∑
l=1
νlhlh
H
l
+
K∑
k=1
τkhe,kh
H
e,k, (46a)
∂L
∂V
= 0,⇒ Z=λf(t)hshHs +µI+
NT∑
i=1
ηiAi−
L∑
l=1
νlhlh
H
l
−
K∑
k=1
τk(t− 1)he,khHe,k, (46b)
QsY = 0,Z  0, λ ≥ 0, ∀i, l, k. (46c)
By subtracting (46b) from (46a), we have
Y − Z = I− λ(1 + f(t))hshHs +
K∑
k=1
τkthe,kh
H
e,k,
⇒ Y = A− λ(1 + f(t))hshHs , (47)
where A = I + Z +
∑K
k=1 τkthe,kh
H
e,k. From (47), one can
easily observe that A is positive definite, and rank(A) = NT ,
whereas rank(Y) = NT or NT − 1. However, if rank(Y) =
NT , then it violates Qs 6= 0. Thus, rank(Y) = NT −1 always
holds, which implies Qs lies in the null space of Y from (46c),
thus rank(Qs) = 1.
This completes Theorem 1. 
D. Proof of Theorem 2
We first write the dual function to (32) as follows:
L(Qs,V,Y,Z, λ, γi,Ts,Te,k,Tl)=Tr(Qs)−Tr(YQs)
−Tr(ZV)+λ[Tr(Qs+V)−P ]+
NT∑
i=1
γi
[
Tr[A¯i(Qs+V)]
+i‖Qs+V‖F−pi
]
−Tr(TsA1)−Tr[TsHHs (Qs−f(t)V)Hs]
−
K∑
k=1
Tr(Te,kBk)+
K∑
k=1
Tr
[
Te,kH
H
e,k[Qs−(t−1−1)V]He,k
]
−
L∑
l=1
Tr(TlCl)−
L∑
l=1
Tr[TlHHl (Qs+V)Hl], (48)
where Y ∈ HNT+ , Z ∈ HNT+ , λ ∈ R+, γi ∈ R+, Ts ∈ HNT+1+ ,
Te,k ∈ HNT+1+ and Tl ∈ HNT+1+ are dual variables of Qs,
V, (29a), (29c) and (29b), respectively. In addition,
A1=
[
βsI 0
0H −f(t)σ2s−βsε2s
]
, Hs=
[
INT h¯s
]
,
Bk=
[
λe,kI 0
0H (t−1−1)σ2e−λe,kε2e,k
]
, He,k=
[
INT h¯e,k
]
,
Cl=
[
αlI 0
0H −El−αlε2l
]
, Hl=
[
INT h¯l
]
.
The related KKT conditions are considered as follows:
∂L
∂Qs
= 0,⇒ Y=I+λI+
NT∑
i=1
γi[A¯i+i‖Qs+W‖−1F I]
−HsTsHHs +
K∑
k=1
He,kTe,kH
H
e,k−
L∑
l=1
HlTlH
H
l , (49a)
∂L
∂V
=0,⇒Z=λI+
NT∑
i=1
γi[A¯i+i‖Qs+W‖−1F I]+f(t)HsTsHHs
−
K∑
k=1
(t−1−1)He,kTe,kHHe,k−
L∑
l=1
HlTlH
H
l , (49b)
QsY = 0,Z0, ∀i, k, l, (49c)
[A1 + H
H
s (Qs − f(t)V)Hs]Ts = 0. (49d)
By subtracting (49b) from (49a), we have
Y−Z=I−[1+f(t)]HsTsHHs +
K∑
k=1
t−1He,kTe,kHHe,k,
⇒Y+[1+f(t)]HsTsHHs =I+Z+
K∑
k=1
t−1He,kTe,kHHe,k. (50)
We premultiply (50) by Qs,
Qs
(
I+Z+
K∑
k=1
t−1He,kTe,kHHe,k
)
=[1+f(t)]QsHsTsH
H
s . (51)
The following rank relation holds:
rank(Qs) = rank
[
Qs
(
I+Z+
K∑
k=1
t−1He,kTe,kHHe,k
)]
= rank(QsHsTsHHs )
≤ min{rank(HsTsHHs ), rank(Qs)} (52)
Based on the above rank relation, we need to show
rank(HsTsHHs ) ≤ 1 if we claim rank(Qs) ≤ 1, thus, we
consider the following two facts:[
INT 0
]
HHs =INT ,
[
INT 0
]
A1 =βs(Hs−
[
0NT h¯s
]
).
Premultiplying
[
INT 0
]
and postmultiplying HHs by (49d),
respectively, and applying the above two equalities, we have
βs(Hs−
[
0NT h¯s
]
)TsH
H
s +[Qs−f(t)V]HsTsHHs =0,
⇒(βsI+[Qs−f(t)V])HsTsHHs =βs
[
0NT h¯s
]
TsH
H
s . (53)
Lemma 3: If a block hermitian matrix P=
[
P1 P2
P3 P4
]
0,
then the main diagonal matrices P1 and P4 must be positive
definite (PSD) matrices [39].
By applying Lemma 3, we can claim βsI+[Qs−f(t)V]0
and is nonsingular, thus pre(post)multiplying by a nonsingular
matrix will not change the matrix rank. Thus, the following
rank relation holds:
rank(HsTsHHs ) = rank(
[
0NT h¯s
]
TsH
H
s )
≤ rank([0NT h¯s ])≤1. (54)
This completes Theorem 2. 
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